China in recent years has emerged as the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world. Many analysts and government officials in the developing world have increasingly expressed concerns that they are losing competitiveness to China. Is China diverting FDI from other developing countries?
Introduction
In recent years, China has become a favorite destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2002, foreign direct investment in China reached US$53 billion. China is on its way to become "the factory of the world". The success of China in attracting foreign direct investment is no accident. One of the earliest strategic policy reforms of China was to open up the South to lure foreign investors. China's attempts to introduce markets into its economy go hand in hand with the liberalization of its FDI regime. In some ways, foreign direct investment reforms can be seen as the vanguard of domestic market reforms.
While increases in FDI from the outside world are complementary to China's efforts to modernize its economy, many developing countries in the world seem to be very worried about the prospects of a rising China that absorbs more and more of the investment from major multinationals. Several governments in Asia and Latin America have publicly noted that the emergence of China has diverted direct investment away from their economies. Policymakers and analysts in the developing world are convinced that the rise of China has contributed to the "hollowing out" phenomenon, with foreign and domestic investors leaving their countries and investing in China instead. This in turn has led to continued loss of manufacturing industries and jobs, further weakening the vitality of these economies. 1 In this paper, we would like to examine empirically the question of whether the successful FDI policy of China has diverted foreign direct investment away from a group of Asian and Latin American economies. In Asia, the economies we will consider include Hong Kong, Taiwan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. In Latin America, the economies we study include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The research strategy is to control for the standard determinants of foreign direct investment and then add a proxy to represent "the China Effect". We then would investigate the sign, significance and magnitude of such a "China Effect".
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we will provide some background discussions related to foreign direct investment in China in general. In section 3, we then survey the relevant policy issues. In section 4 we examine the current academic literature of the determination of FDI. In section 5, we set up the empirical model to be estimated. In section 6, we present and discuss our results. Section 7 concludes.
Some General Characteristics of Foreign Direct Investment in China
One of the most important elements of China's economic reform has been the promotion of foreign direct investment inflow. FDI in China has grown dramatically over the past two decades, since China initiated its 'open-door' policy in 1978 (Table 1) should pursue, we now look at selectively some recent relevant academic literature.
3 Brainard (1997) empirically examines the determinants of the ratio of U.S. export sales to total foreign sales (the sum of export sales by sales by foreign affiliates) by industry. She uses a framework of focusing on factors that favor concentration of production (i.e. favoring exports) vs. proximity to overseas customers (i.e. favoring sales by foreign affiliates). The explanatory variables include freight costs to the export market, tariffs of the host country, per capita gross domestic product, corporate tax rates, measures of trade and foreign direct investment openness, measures of plant scale economies and corporate scale economies. She also adds a dummy representing whether a country has a political coup in the last decade. In her random effects estimation, almost all the variables have the right signs and are significant. The major exception is the corporate tax rates, which has the opposite sign as predicted.
Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998) focus on policy reforms in developing countries as determinants of foreign direct investment inflows. They employ both ordinary least squares as well as panel estimations. The expected rates of growth, the corporate tax rates, the degree of corruption and the degree of openness to foreign direct investment are all important determinants of foreign direct investment flows into these economies. Hines (1995) and Wei (1997) 
The Empirical Model
In this section we provide an empirical model to estimate the impact of China American countries and for China are written as a linear specification of the following form:
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where the subscript "i" and "t" stands for country i at period t and the variables used in this analysis are defined below. The independent variables examined in the analysis are believed to exert an influence on inward foreign direct investment in each country of East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and China by changing the investment environment through institutional and policy changes as well as the relevant economic conditions such as the market sizes.
The main variable that we shall examine in this paper is the proxy for the China Effect CFDI. There are two sets of arguments that we should consider here. First, in examining which low-wage export platform to locate, multinationals may choose between investing in China vs. investing in another country, say Thailand or Mexico. In this case, the multinationals will study the whole host of factors, including wage rates, political risks, infrastructure, etc. that would make a country desirable as a site for lowcost production. Investing in China will then reduce the FDI in another Asian or Latin American economy. The sign of CFDI, according to this argument is negative. We shall call this the "investment-diversion effect".
The second aspect is the production and resource linkages between a growing
China and the rest of Asia and parts of Latin America. In manufacturing, this takes the form of further specialization and growing fragmentation of the production processes.
An investor sets up factories in both China, Thailand and Mexico to take advantage of their respective competitiveness in distinct stages of productions. Components and parts are then traded among China and other economies. An increase in China's FDI is then positively related to an increase in Thailand's or Mexican FDI. Lall and Weiss (2004) document some early signs of an electronics production network between China and Mexico.
A different but complementary argument is that as China grows, its market size increases and its appetite for minerals and resources also rises. Subsequently, foreign firms rush into China to produce in China and to sell in China. At the same time, other multinationals also invest in other parts of Asia and Latin America to extract minerals and resources to export to a fast-growing China in need of a whole spectrum of raw materials. These commodities include copper, steel, aluminum, petroleum, coal and soybeans. This line of reasoning leads one to predict that the sign of CFDI to be positive.
We call this effect the "investment-creation effect". Theoretically we cannot determine a prior the net effect of investment-creation and investment-diversion for China. It is thus important to examine this issue empirically, as we attempt to do in this paper.
In light of the academic literature that we have surveyed, there are five sets of standard determinants that we will control to isolate the China Effect. They are market size variables, labor market conditions, institutional variables, policy variables and the global supply of FDI. These are variables that we identify as important from our literature survey. We will discuss these sets of determinants next.
A substantial literature has developed confirming empirically the importance of the size of the host market and its growth rate. These are measured by GDP, the growth rate of real GDP per capita or real GDP growth. The foreign investors that target the local market are assumed to be more attracted to the country with a higher growth rate of The level of human capital is demonstrated to be an another important determinant of the marginal productivity of capital. It has been shown in various studies that skill-related variables are host-country specific. When a host country is more appealing to labor-intensive foreign investment that requires a relatively low level of skills, the importance of the human capital variable tends to be small. On the other hand, labor skills can be a more significant factor for a host country, in which more capital-and technology intensive investment projects are concentrated. In this analysis, we utilize illiteracy rate as a proxy for the level of human capital.
We also examine the significance of institutional factors in the determination of FDI by incorporating the level of corruption, an indicator of the rule of law and an indicator of the stability of each government. Corruption as well as a lack of the rule of law can discourage FDI by inducing a higher cost of doing business. Hines (1995) shows that FDI from the United States grew more rapidly in less corrupt countries than in more corrupt countries after 1977. Wei (1997) presents alternative explanation of the large negative and significant effect of corruption on FDI. Unlike taxes, corruption is not transparent and involves many factors that are more arbitrary in nature. The agreement between a briber and a corrupt official is hard to enforce and creates more uncertainty over the total questionable payments or the final outcome. Wei demonstrates that this type of uncertainty induced by corruption leads to a reduction in FDI. Political stability of a government and a lack of the rule of law can also be important factors to foster the inflow of FDI. Uncertain political environments and their related risks can impede FDI inflows in spite of favorable economic conditions. Since the indices of corruption, instability and the rule of law assign higher scores to less corrupt, better law enforcement or a more stable country, the expected signs of the variables, CORRUPT , GOV and LAW, are all positive.
Also included in the analysis are policy-related variables, tariff barriers proxied by import duty, corporate tax rates, openness to foreign trade and the quality of infrastructure. The effect of tariffs on the behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is methodologically demonstrated by Horst (1971) . He predicts that in the face of higher tariffs imposed by the host countries, other things being equal, MNEs will increase its production abroad and decrease its exports. More recent models highlight the effect of tariffs on FDI within the context of vertical and horizontal specialization within MNEs.
A typical vertical FDI can be characterized by individual affiliates specializing in different stages of production of the output. The semi-finished products in turn are exported to other affiliates for further processing. By fragmenting the production process, parents and affiliates take advantage of factor price differentials across countries.
Horizontal specialization on the other hand, involves each affiliate' engagement in similar types of production. A typical horizontal FDI can be associated with marketseeking behavior and is motivated to avoid trade costs. Choosing between engaging in horizontal FDIs or exporting would involve calculating the trade-off between trade costs and economies of scale.
The MNEs, which set up vertical production networks may be encouraged to invest in a country with relatively low tariff barriers due to a lower cost of their imported intermediate products. Therefore, the expected sign of DUTY is negative. In contrast, high tariff barriers induce firms engaging in horizontal FDI to replace exports with production abroad by foreign affiliates (Brainard, 1997; Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001 ). This "tariff jumping" theory implies a positive relationship between DUTY and FDI. Since the styled fact about East Asia and Latin America is that a business network is in place in Asia but not in Latin America, the expected sign of DUTY in the Asian regressions is negative, while for Latin America, it is positive (Fukao and Okubo 2003,
Ando and Kimura 2003).
OPEN is included to examine the importance of openness of an economy to international trade. The variable measures the degree of general trade restrictions of each country. Following the same line of reasoning above, a negative relationship between openness and market-seeking FDI is expected, and a positive relationship is expected for export-oriented FDI. In addition, in some economies, openness can be an indicator of economic reforms, where domestic reforms and foreign trade reform go hand in hand.
FDI can be attracted to a country with more economic reforms.
Another policy-related variable that can influence the host country's location advantage is the host country's corporate or other tax rates. The MNEs, as global profit maximizers, can be assumed to be sensitive to tax factors, since they have a direct effect on their profits. The evidence of significant negative influences of corporate tax rates are reported in previous studies by Wei (1997) , Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998), and Hsiao (2001) . Better developed regions with a superior quality of infrastructure can also be more attractive to foreign firms relative to others by including in our regressions the proxy, the number of telephone mainlines per 1000 people. Parker (2002), Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2003) as well as Fung, Garcia-Herrero, Iizaka and Siu (2005) show that at least in some instances, FDI is attracted to a Chinese province with a better infrastructure. Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
A constant is included in the model but not reported. Many of the countries examined are heavily involved in vertical specialization, particularly in electric and electronics industries, which can be seen in the share of twoway trade in the same industry in the total volume of trade among the nations (Table 4 ).
Our main variable of interest C F D I is
The economic ties of mutual dependence among them have been deepening rapidly since 1990s. The significance of the China Effect in the level of FDI inflows to our group of Asian countries may reflect such interdependence. Thus our empirical study shows that an increase in China's FDI is positively and significantly related to FDI inflows in other Asian economies. Our central result here is then as follows: up to now the investmentenhancing effect dominates the investment-diversion effect so that overall China is a positive force for FDI inflows into other Asian economies. The effect of openness, denoted by the variable OPEN, has an expected positive sign and is always significant in its inclusion. Openness captures the degree of both tariff and non-tariff measures including various trade costs. In contrast to the effect of tariff barriers proxied by DUTY, which is another significant variable, the impact of openness to trade on the inflow of FDI is substantial. The results in Table 3 suggest that, all else being equal, the marginal effect of trade liberalization of the Asian countries on the inflow of FDI can be more than twice as large as that of the China Effect. Trade impediments can take various forms such as local content requirements, technology transfer requirements, domestic sales and export requirements, and so on. Our results imply that reductions in the various types of trade barriers can play a vital role in promoting FDI to those countries.
Corporate tax is another variable that is found to exert a large influence on the level of the inflows of FDI in this analysis. Although many countries offer various forms of tax incentives for foreign investors, corporate tax rates can be considered as one of the most influential tools to promote investment since it has a direct impact on the profitability of their investment projects. The effects of corporate tax rates are in most cases larger than the China Effect.
For the East and Southeast Asian economies, the GDP variable is significant but seems to have the wrong sign. However, its significance disappears once DUTY is added into the regressions. This seems to indicate that the GDP variable is not very robust. The degree of government stability, the index of corruption and the index for the rule of law, GOV, CORRUPT and LAW, are all insignificant. The OUTFLOW variables are positive FDI to these Asian economies. The proxy for infrastructure is also significant, even though it has a very small coefficient.
Overall, factors that affect the FDI inflows into East and Southeast Asia are the positive China Effect, policy variables such as the degree of openness to trade and the quality of infrastructure and the world supply of the FDI. In this empirical exercise, we change the dependent variable from the level of FDI to the country's share of the total FDI flowing into all developing countries (Table 5 ).
The idea is to capture the notion that some government officials may be concerned about their shares and not just the levels of their FDI. Here we found that the China Effect is negative and significant. This means that China does reduce the shares of these economies out of the total FDI inflows to all developing countries. Furthermore, the China Effect is large.
OPEN and DUTY are as in the regressions with levels, significant. Corporate tax rates have the expected negative signs. The index of government stability has a small coefficient, but it is significant. Infrastructure is also positive and significant. But labor market variables including the wage rates and the degree of illiteracy seem to have the wrong signs. Overall, the dominant determinants of the Asian economies' shares of FDI into all developing countries are the negative China Effect, policy variables such as openness to trade, corporate tax rates and infrastructure as well as the institutional factor of government stability. Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
A constant is included in the model but not reported. (3), (5) and (8)), the magnitudes of the coefficients are quite small, generally smaller than those in the regressions for Asia. This is consistent with the fact that the similarity of exports between China and the Latin American economies is still rather modest (Lall and Weiss 2004) . Except for Mexico, multinational firms in general do not view China and most of the Latin American countries as competing sites for processing their products. We thus do not find a systematic negative China Effect.
On the other hand, unlike China and the rest of Asia, there is no comparable network of production-sharing in place between China and Latin America. There are indications that in electronics, a production fragmentation network may be forming between China and Mexico (Lall and Weiss 2004) . Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
A constant is included in the model but not reported.
Does China Reduce Latin American Economies' Shares of Total FDI inflows into Developing Countries?
In the next table, we present our panel regression results using the Latin American economies' shares of FDI flows going to all developing countries as the dependent variable ( Table 7 ). The China Effect in this case is negative and significant. As in the regressions with levels, other variables that are significant include the sizes of the markets, growth of per capita income and the extent of trade restrictions. Even though the China Effect is negative and significant here, its effect is much smaller compared to the market size variables. DUTY as an explanatory variable also has a larger coefficient.
Thus, even if policymakers are concerned with his/her countries' FDI shares, the dominant influence here does not seem to be due to the emergence of China. Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Conclusion
China's development strategy to attract foreign firms has been a huge success. These results are consistent with the view that there is a thick and growing production network within these Asian economies and China, but except for Mexico, there is relatively little vertical production-sharing among the Latin American countries.
Thus multinationals may want to set up factories and distribution network in both China and other parts of Asia to accommodate their increasingly sophisticated global supply chains, but they do not seem to view China and Latin America systematically as rival, alternative sites of business networks. Second, in terms of the shares of developing countries' foreign direct investments, the China effect is negative for both the East and Southeast Asian economies as well as for the Latin American economies. Thus while both the level of China's foreign direct investment and the levels of foreign direct investments of our Asian economies are increasing together and that there is no strong relationship between foreign direct investment into China and into Latin America, an increase in China's investment is associated with a decline in the Asian and Latin China effect is in general not the most important factor determining the inflows of foreign direct investments into these economies. Specifically, market size variables and policy variables such as the lower corporate taxes and higher degrees of openness play larger roles in attracting investment.
